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Làm thế nào để có thể quay đầu lại khi nhận banh?

1. Pressing không cho đối phương có thể quay đầu lại

Một điều cực kì quan trọng trong phòng ngự là áp sát nhanh để cho đối phương khi nhận banh không thể quay đầu lại. Tại sao?

Khi để đối phương quay đầu lại, tức là đối phương sẽ có thể dẫn banh hoặc chuyền banh lên phía trước thay vì chuyền về. Điều này tạo lên áp lực rất lớn cho toàn bộ hàng phòng ngự. Đặc biệt, lúc này các cầu thủ đối phương có đủ thời gian để lao lên phía trên tấn công => các tiền đạo của ta phải chạy về và đuổi theo mệt mỏi.

Có tiền đạo nào muốn chạy về để phòng ngự? Một hai lần thì còn chấp nhận được, chứ nhiều lần sẽ dẫn đến ức chế. Từ đó sẽ có lúc tiền đạo mệt mỏi và thiếu quyết tâm dẫn đến các tình huống không chạy về kèm người.

Kết luận: điều quan trọng trong phòng ngự là khi banh ở biên thì kèm khu vực thả lỏng mà không cần pressing nhiều nếu thấy không cần thiết. Khi banh được chuyền đến cầu thủ trung tâm, thì phải bức tốc pressing đến sau lưng đối phương để cho đối phương không thể quay đầu lại được.

2. Làm thế nào để khống chế banh mà vẫn quay người lại được khi bị pressing?

- Cách 1: Bật 1 chạm về

Khi đối phương pressing quá tốt, ta chỉ có thể bật 1 chạm chuyền về hoặc bật 1 chạm cho banh hướng lên (xác suất thành công không cao và đòi trình độ kĩ thuật cao). Khi bật 1 chạm chuyền về thì phía dưới phải di chuyển thật tốt mới có đủ không gian để nhận lại banh, nếu không sẽ rất nguy hiểm.
Bài tập cần thiết là, cầu thủ chuyền lên phải chủ động chuyền rồi di chuyển để nhận lại banh bất cứ lúc nào. Trong tình huống này người chuyền là người chủ động, người nhận là người bị động như 1 bức tường để bật lại.

- Cách 2: Học cách che người

Xoắn 2 cánh tay để 2 lòng bàn tay hướng ra ngoài.

Ngoài ra kết hợp với các kĩ năng xoay 360 độ của Xavi hay Messi.

330364BA00000578-3532434-image-a-38_1460289575363
3302F99C00000578-3532434-image-a-44_1460289817709

- Cách 3: Lấn người thật cứng, tạo không gian để thả trôi banh

Đây là chiêu ruột của Luis Suarez.

Điều kiện thứ nhất để thành công là người chuyền phải chuyền banh đi với lực vừa phải.

Điều kiện thứ hai là phải bật chuyền 1 chạm nhuần nhuyễn. Khi đó đối phương sẽ theo thói quen tưởng ta bật 1 chạm mà pressing mạnh hơn để cắt banh. Lúc đó, ta phải giữ thế lấn người thật tốt để banh trôi đi.

Đây là 1 chiêu quan trọng bật nhất để chống pressing, khi đối phương bắt đầu sợ ta bỏ banh thì sẽ hạn chế pressing mạnh => ta dễ khống chế banh và xoay người lại => đối phương sẽ mệt chết.

pes-shielding-the-ball


3. Nhiệm vụ quan trọng của người nhận banh ở trung tâm

- Đá biên hay trung tâm đều có vai trò riêng và quan trọng như nhau. Tuy nhiên, ở các bài trước đã phân tích khi banh ở biên thì rất dễ bị đối phương pressing vì ở biên ta ko có nhiều lựa chọn xử lý banh => Sự yếu ớt khi nhận banh ở biên => lúc nào cũng cần 1 cầu thủ trung tâm chạy lại thật gần cầu thủ đá biên để nhận lại banh.

=> Từ nay về sau, trong đầu điều đầu tiên khi có banh là chuyền banh lên cho người trung tâm. Khi có banh ở biên thì phải lập tức trả banh lại cầu thủ trung tâm, không được tham banh. Cầu thủ biên nên giữ banh lâu chỉ khi muốn đột phá thôi.

Trong cách chơi này, ko có khái niệm tiền đạo cấm, ta sẽ chơi số 9 ảo lùi sâu để nhận banh. Cầu thủ trung tâm giữ vai trò là cầu thủ phòng ngự cứng cựa đầu tiên khi không thể khống chế banh làm mất bóng.

Cuối cùng, bóng đá ai khỏe hơn người đó thắng. Câu hỏi là bạn khỏe nhưng liệu bạn có biết sử dụng hết mức khỏe đó chưa. Các lý thuyết về cách chơi bóng ở trên chủ yếu giúp ta có thể bộc lộ sức khỏe một cách tự nhiên, chủ động. Chơi banh 1 cách uyển chuyển tức là chơi có flow, ko cứng nhắt. Khi bạn có sức khỏe mà có thể bộc lộ hết khả năng của mình thì qua thời gian sẽ có lúc bạn sẽ phá vỡ giới hạn cũ để tiến tới giới hạn mới cao hơn. Người ta nói, trăm sông đều đổ về biển, mỗi người có cách tiến bộ riêng của mình. Lý thuyết về bóng đá này là cách giúp ta phát triển tự nhiên ngay trong lúc chơi, ko cần phải bắt ép bản thân trong phòng gym.
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Keeping possession vs losing possesstion

Giữ banh 70% hay 50% không quan trọng. Quan trọng là cách thức ta kết thúc từng lượt giữ banh. Giữ banh mà bị cắt banh hoặc tệ hơn là bị cướp bóng thì giữ banh như vậy là tệ. Giữ banh là phải kết thúc được pha bóng đó như dứt điểm, quick ball recovery khi mất bóng.

Khi đội bóng có tâm lý giữ bóng và các cầu thủ có xu hướng lao lên thì việc mất bóng lãng xẹt là không thể chấp nhận được. Ví dụ khi chuyền banh đến ra biên và sâu tới corners, nếu không thể đột phá hoặc tạt vào thì phải chuyền về. Nếu xử lý cẩu thả để mất banh thì dẫn tới cả đội phải gánh chịu 1 đợt phản công. Nếu trong trận cứ để tình trạng này lập đi lập lại sẽ dẫn tới mất sức vô cùng và dẫn tới tâm lý không an toàn, không chắc chắn.

Tóm lại, phải biết kết thúc một pha giữ bóng, nếu ko kết thúc được thì phải chuyền về và làm lại. Ko được mất banh một cách hời hợt. Biết cách nên hay không nên kết thúc một pha bóng sẽ làm cho thời lượng giữ banh tăng.
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This is the football i dream of

Barcelona vs Celta Vigo 5/3/2017

1. Thống kê
https://www.whoscored.com/Matches/1102979/Live/Spain-La-Liga-2016-2017-Barcelona-Celta-Vigo
image

2. Điểm nổi bật
- Rafinha đá ngay vị trí của Messi. Rafinha thuận chân trái. Rafinha có cách giữ banh và che người rất tốt.
=> Tiền vệ giữ banh thuận chân nào đá cánh ngược lại

- Roberto đá tiền vệ kiêm hậu vệ cánh phải => ý tưởng của Pep Guardiola hồi còn ở Bayern Munich

- Messi được đẩy vào đá trung lộ như 1 số 9 ảo.
=> Không bị hậu vệ ép sát và nhận được nhiều banh hơn.
=> Messi phối hợp với Neymar nhiều hơn và chọc khe cho Suarez dễ dàng hơn.

- Rakitic chuyển sang cánh trái nên nhận banh để xử lý dễ dàng hơn
=> Bình thường Rakitic đá bên cánh phải. Rakitic khi phối hợp với Messi hay bị dạt ra biên. Nhưng do Rakitic thuận chân phải và không phải dạng cầu thủ có thể lủi thẳng xuống biên nên đá rất bị động, không ảnh hưởng đến trận đấu được nhiều.

- Denis Suarez thay cho Neymar cũng hoạt động giống như Rafinha là trụ biên và giữ banh.

3. Kết luận
Dưới thời Luiz Enrique, Barca thi đấu rất rất cứng nhắc và thiếu sự di chuyển của các tuyến. Mùa đầu tiên mà Barca ăn 3, sau khi thua PSG ở trận lượt đi, Barca đá trận lượt về với đội hình 343 với Pedro đá cánh phải đã thắng thuyết phục PSG. Nhưng Barca ko tiếp tục sử dụng 343 mà lại quay về 433. Sau trận thua Real Sociedad, đá 3 trận liên tiếp với Atletico Madrid đã giúp Barca tăng rất nhiều thể lực nhờ việc trở lại lối đá pressing lúc xưa. Pique liên tục bị chỉ trích cũng tỏa sáng trong lối đá pressing. Pique rất yếu trong các tình huống 1 đối 1 nên việc pressing giúp hạn chế bộc lộ yếu điểm đó.

Quay về Barca năm 2012, đầu mùa thi đấu ko tốt, Villa và Pedro chấn thương, phải club world cup. Nhưng nửa mùa sau Barca đá thằng mười mấy trận liên tiếp để bám sát Real Madrid và thắng hủy diệt ở Champion League. Đó là nhờ chuyển sang chơi 334 với Cuenca và Tello tấn công 2 biên, Fabregras và Messi đá trung tâm. Barca năm 2012 thực sự đá rất rất hay. Pep từng nói Barca thời điểm vô địch club world cup là Barca hay nhất mà ông từng dẫn dắt. Trong trận chung kết club world cup, Thiago Alcatara đá vị trí tiền đạo cánh trái như Denis Suarez. Barca 2012 không may khi thua Chelsea ở bán kết C1 và Real Madrid 100 điểm.

Barca trận gặp Celta Vigo đã giải thoát được hai biên. Hai biên dâng lên, trung lộ lùi xuống. YOLO.
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The reasons why i don’t like football

Boring football

- 22 cầu thủ tranh giành 1 quả bóng

- Trong 1 trận đấu, số lần chạm banh của 1 cầu thủ là rất ít.

- Từ đó, cơ hội để cầu thủ đó cải thiện khả năng của mình là rất thấp. Sự tiến bộ là động lực. Bóng đá không vui.

- Các cầu thủ đa phần không biết cách chạy chỗ và tìm vị trí trống để nhận banh => mất banh liên tục.
- Phòng thủ khu vực kết hợp pressing chính là cách phòng thủ hiện đại. Phòng thủ hiện đại là phải biết bù trừ người hợp lý.

- Không biết chơi các triết lý trong bóng rổ như screen, post-up, steal,…

- Do đó, tiến bộ khi thi đấu trên sân là rất khó. Muốn thật đột phá, mỗi cầu thủ phải tự phát triển khả năng của mình, tự học hỏi các triết lý, các cách di chuyển, các tình huống.

- Khi thi đấu, chúng ta cần sự tiến bộ về thể lực và sự tự tin. Khi mọi thứ đã được học và chuẩn bị kĩ thì hãy ra sân để tăng thêm sự tự tin.
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Chasing back or waiting up front

pedro chasing back

- Nếu bạn là tiền đạo, khi bạn chơi với những hậu vệ chỉ biết phòng thủ và không hay dâng lên tấn công thì bạn nên đứng yên ở trên và không nên lùi quá sâu về sân nhà.

- Nếu bạn là hậu vệ và thích lên tham gia tấn công thì phải chơi với những tiền đạo hay lui về hỗ trợ phòng ngự. Nếu bạn ko thích lên, tiền đạo ko thích về thì đội hình sẽ cứng nhắc, nhàm chán.

=> Suy cho cùng, để đạt được hiệu quả tốt đa, ta cần biết được phong cách di chuyển của đồng đội.
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Why is Pep teams so consistent?

Pep in Barca B

1. Số lượng
- Đa số các đội bóng đá rất bị động. Nhiều cầu thủ có mặt trên sân không linh hoạt trong việc thay đổi vị trí.
- Pep đòi hỏi một cầu thủ phải đa năng và chạy chỗ không banh hợp lý. Như vậy Pep team đá với 11 người đúng nghĩa.

2. Chấn thương
Một cầu thủ quan trọng bị chấn thương ảnh hưởng rất nhiều đến thành tích của đội bóng.
- Cầu thủ của Pep đa năng nên có thể thay thế cho cầu thủ bị chấn thương.
- Pep nhấn mạnh việc phối hợp và di chuyển linh hoạt. Mỗi cầu thủ có một vai trò nhất định như tấn công one on one, tiền vệ phòng ngự lùi sâu, số 9 ảo, hai biên dâng cao và sáp vào trong để làm tiền vệ trung tâm. Việc chia nhiệm vụ rõ ràng như thế giúp việc thay thế cầu thủ mang tính ổn định cao hơn.
- Đội hình dự bị đá champion league cũng thắng 4-0 https://www.whoscored.com/Matches/555693/Live
- Nhiều cầu thủ trẻ được đôn lên đá thường xuyên.

3. Nhân hòa
- Là cầu thủ ai cũng muốn được cầm banh để tấn công
- Pep xây dựng hệ thống phòng ngự từ xa hiệu quả để củng cố triết lý tấn công
- Đá banh đúng sở thích của mình càng làm cho cầu thủ cố gắng hết sức mình mà cảm thấy dễ chịu. Đó chính là sự chủ động.
- Pep yêu cầu 11 cầu thủ phải chạy và pressing nên lúc nào Pep team cũng chạy nhiều hơn đối thủ.
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Passing the ball to the wings with real force

Thực hiện các đường chuyền ra hai biên với lực thật mạnh để đảm bảo không bị cắt banh
=> Cầu thủ cánh tập khống chế và xử lý banh
=> Tăng độ khó bằng cách chuyền với tốc độ cao hoặc chuyền banh bổng
=> Cầu thủ biên tập khống chế banh rồi dẫn banh vào trong hoặc chuyền 1 chạm lai hoặc đẩy 1 chạm rồi cấm đầu chạy
image
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Tĩnh và động

Messi and Alves

- Trong không gian rộng, khi phối hợp, người chuyền tĩnh, người nhận banh động.

- Trong không gian hẹp, khi phối hợp, người chuyền động, người nhận banh tĩnh.

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Pep talks about Iniesta (Iniesta new book)

Cover of the book The Artist: Being Iniesta
“I think Paco defined him perfectly,” Guardiola says. Paco Seirulo was Barcelona’s former physical coach, the man from whom Lorenzo Buenaventura learnt; now Guardiola makes Seirulo’s description his own. “Andrés is one of the greats. Why? Because of his mastery of the relationship between space and time. He knows where he is at every moment. Even in a midfield where he’s surrounded by countless players, he chooses the right path every time. He knows where and when, always. And then he has this very unique ability to pull away. He pulls out, then brakes, then pulls out again, then brakes again. There are very few players like him.

“There are footballers who are very good playing on the outside but don’t know what to do inside. Then there are players who are very good inside but don’t have the physique, the legs, to go outside. Andrés has the ability to do both. When you’re out on the touchline, like a winger, it is easier to play. You see everything: the mess, the crowd, the activity is all inside. When you play inside, you don’t see anything in there because so much is happening in such a small space and all around you. You don’t know where the opposition is going to come at you from, or how many of them. Great footballers are those who know how to play in both of those environments. Andrés doesn’t only have the ability to see everything, to know what to do, but also the talent to execute it; he’s able to break through those lines. He sees it and does it.

“I’ve been a coach for a few years now and I have come to the conclusion that a truly good player is always a good player,” Guardiola says. “It’s very hard to teach a bad player to be a good one. You can’t really teach someone to dribble. The timing needed to go past someone, that instant in which you catch out your opponent, when you go past him and a new scenario opens up before you … Dribbling is, at heart, a trick, a con. It’s not speed. It’s not physique. It’s an art.”

Lorenzo Buenaventura says: “What happens is that Andrés brakes. That’s the key, the most important thing. People say: ‘Look how quick he is!’ No, no, that’s not the point. It’s not about speed, about how fast he goes; what it’s really about is how he stops and when, then, how he gets moving again.”
Guardiola adds: “Tito Vilanova defined him very well. Tito used to say: ‘Andrés doesn’t run, he glides. He’s like an ice hockey player, only without skates on. Sssswishhh, sssswishhh, sssswishhhh …’ That description is evocative, very graphic, and I think it’s an accurate one. He goes towards one side as if he was skating, watching everything that’s going on around him. Then, suddenly, he turns the other way with that smoothness he has. Yes, that’s it, Andrés doesn’t run, he glides.”

Guardiola adds: “Sometimes in life, it’s first impressions that count and the first impression I have of Andrés was the day my brother Pere, who was working for Nike at the time, told me about Iniesta. I was still playing for Barcelona myself and he said: ‘Pep, you’ve got to come and see this kid.’ It was before the final of the Nike Cup. I remember getting changed quickly after training and rushing there, dashing to the stadium. And yes, I saw how good he was. I told myself: ‘This kid will play for Barcelona, for sure … he’s going to make it.’ I told myself that, and I told Pere that too.

“On my way out of the ground after that final when Andrés was the best player on the pitch, I came across Santiago Segurola, the football writer. I said to him: ‘I’ve just seen something incredible.’ I had this feeling that what I’d just witnessed was unique. That was my first impression of Andrés.
“But later,” Guardiola admits, “I came to really value something else Andrés does, something that he had made me see with time: the importance of attacking the centre-backs. No one does it. But watch and you see it. If the central defender has to step out, everything opens up; the whole defence becomes disorganised and spaces appear that weren’t there before. It’s all about breaking through lines to find space behind them. Open, then find.

“For example, we set up our attack so that Leo Messi could attack the central defenders,” Guardiola explains. “We had to attack in such a way as to get the ball to Andrés and Leo so that they could attack the central defenders and that opened them up. When we managed that, we knew that we would win the game because Leo scored goals and Andrés generated everything else: dribbling, numerical superiority, the ability to unbalance the game, the final pass, both to the outside and filtered through the middle. He sees it all and he has that gift for dribbling that’s so unique to him. That dribbling ability is everything today. And it was Andrés who opened my eyes to the importance of an inside forward or midfielder being able to dribble too. If he dribbles, if he carries the ball and goes at people, everything flows. With time, I saw that.”
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The Pep Challenge: A Superstar Football Coach Comes to Munich

By Markus Feldenkirchen and Juan Moreno

pep success

Wildly successful football coach Pep Guardiola sought out Bayern Munich as his next challenge. But he is arriving just after the team had one of the most successful seasons the Bundesliga has ever seen. Will he stand up to the pressure?

On July 26, 2011, Karl-Heinz Rummenigge and Uli Hoeness were sitting in the VIP restaurant at the Allianz Arena when a man with a shaved head walked in and sat down at a table. He was alone. When they recognized who he was, Rummenigge stood up and went over to say hello to football coach Pep Guardiola. "Can I speak with you for a moment?" Guardiola asked. Rummenigge asked Hoeness to join them, and they ordered three espressos. At that moment, Rummenigge and Hoeness -- the chairman and club president of powerhouse football team FC Bayern Munich, respectively -- had no idea what Guardiola wanted. But of course they were interested in talking to him.

Pep Guardiola had traveled to Munich with his team, FC Barcelona, for a sponsor's tournament, the Audi Cup. His team had just won the semifinal against the Brazilian team Porto Alegre, and the second semifinal, pitting FC Bayern Munich against AC Milan, was about to begin.

He liked FC Bayern, the Spanish coach said. He had toured the club grounds on Säbener Strasse that morning, and now the Allianz Arena. "You have an interesting philosophy," he said. Then he said something that Rummenigge and Hoeness hadn't expected: "I could imagine coaching here some day."

"He was making a clear statement," says Rummenigge. Guardiola was approaching the Bavarians, and not the other way around. When Rummenigge talks about it at the club's headquarters today, he still seems flabbergasted. He shakes his head. "I don't know if I would have dared to ask him at the time: 'Could you ever imagine coaching for Bayern Munich?'"

At that point, Guardiola was already much more than just a successful coach, and much more than someone who is hired because he can promise victories and trophies.

Guardiola was seen as an inventor, someone who had given the game of soccer a new dimension. His FC Barcelona was playing more efficiently, faster, more precisely and more beautifully than other teams. The club had discovered a new identity through its young coach, and its game became a trademark that even the layman could recognize. There was something different about Barça games, something elegant.

"It was the best team we've ever played," said Sir Alex Ferguson, coach of Manchester United since 1986, after their defeat in the 2011 Champions League final. The secret lay in Guardiola's Barça code. After that performance in Wembley Stadium, even Ferguson would have agreed with the statement that Guardiola had changed football the way Steve Jobs changed the computer, Bobby Fischer the game of chess and the Beatles pop music.

When Guardiola said his goodbyes and gave Rummenigge a piece of paper with his mobile phone number on it, Rummenigge put it away and made sure he kept it in a safe place. He knew that he had been given a small treasure.

In two weeks, when Guardiola coaches Bayern Munich for the first time, it will be two years after the brief conversation that began the most spectacular coaching contract in the history of Germany's national football league, the Bundesliga.

A 'Very Nice Contract'

The story behind that contract is one of convergence that many believed impossible. It's the story of a relatively small group of men who got together because they essentially share the same traits: unlimited ambition and the will to prove it to everyone. The Bavarians recognized the opportunity to be the measure of all things in the long term, not just in German football, but in European football, as well. Guardiola wanted to show that Barcelona was no accident, and that he didn't just owe his success to three exceptional footballers: Lionel Messi, Andrés Iniesta and Xavi.

He won't be giving any interviews for now, but even if he does, he will always be asked the same questions. What kind of a person is he? Can he repeat what he achieved in Barcelona? And why did he go with Bayern Munich instead of opting for the sheikhs and oligarchs of world football?

"The truth? I too was surprised when Pep called me back then and said: 'I gave Karl-Heinz Rummenigge my number in Munich, and I think he'll call me'," says his younger brother Pere Guardiola, who is the coach's most important adviser. He resembles his brother. Perhaps he is a little shorter, but he has the same comforting voice and speaks with the same musical Catalan intonation.

Pere Guardiola is sitting in a conference room on the 14th floor of a high-rise in the eastern part of Barcelona. He is managing director of Media Base Sports, an agency established in 2009 that specializes in Barça players. Pere secured several endorsement deals for David Villa and manages Iniesta's Twitter account. He negotiated his brother's deal with the Bavarians, which he calls a "very nice contract." It's eight or nine pages long, precise and "somehow German."

After returning from Munich, Pep told his brother that it wasn't just the training facility and the new stadium that he liked. Guardiola was also impressed by the squad, which was cleverly structured and, with "two or three minor corrections," had tremendous potential. He recognized the structures that Louis van Gaal had developed: the offensive game, the counter-pressing and a style of play that emphasizes ball possession.

Pere knew that his brother liked traditional teams, such as Ajax Amsterdam, Juventus Turin, Manchester United and Bayern Munich. While FC Bayern represents vast amounts of money in Germany, in other countries the club is identified with an illustrious past in the 1970s.

Pep, his brother, just happens to be a "romantic" for whom "tradition, history, the heroes of the past, those kinds of things" mean a great deal, says Pere. He used to work for Nike before becoming an agent. "Those kinds of things" aren't quite as important to him, he says. He isn't a romantic, but he is someone who has had plenty of encounters with the big money aspect of world football since last summer. Representatives of Massimo Moratti, Inter Milan, Roman Abramovich, FC Chelsea, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Manchester City, Sheikh Nasser Al-Khelaifi, Paris Saint-Germain, Silvio Berlusconi and AC Milan came to see him. They all wanted Guardiola, and they all seemed like junkies in withdrawal. They needed the drug that only Guardiola seemed to have.

"I called Giovanni and set him to work on the Bavarians," says Pere. Giovanni Branchini is one of Italy's top agents, and an old acquaintance of Hoeness and Rummenigge. Considered discreet and professional, he orchestrated Stefan Effenberg's move to Florence in the 1990s and brought Brazilian player Ronaldo to Barcelona and, later, to Inter Milan. "We didn't want it to seem as if we were offering ourselves to the Bavarians. My brother just wanted to make sure that they understood that he thought Bayern was interesting," says Pere. Branchini was given an assignment: to arrange a meeting with the Bavarians.

European football has changed considerably since Guardiola began his coaching career at FC Barcelona in the summer of 2008. He was one of the worst-paid coaches in the Primera División, without professional experience and faced with the legacy of an unruly squad trained by his predecessor, Frank Rijkaard. The change has something to do with Guardiola's record, which reads like a sugarcoated biography. In four years, he won 14 out of 19 possible titles, including two Champions League victories, three national titles and two FIFA Club World Cup trophies.

But the problems began to accumulate in early 2011. Both French defender Éric Abidal and Guardiola's friend and assistant coach Tito Vilanova were diagnosed with cancer. The team lost some of its intensity. Guardiola's talks sometimes lacked persuasiveness, and he started having trouble motivating his players. Guardiola is a strong communicator. He can be witty, glib and sometimes even funny.

In the meantime, rival club Real Madrid had bought itself the world's most expensive team, and its top priority was to defeat Guardiola's Barcelona. A dispute with José Mourinho, Guardiola's adversary at Real, escalated. During one of the matches between the two teams, known in Spain as El Clásico, there were scuffles between players and coaches.

Even golden boy Lionel Messi was causing problems. Guardiola was increasingly tailoring Barcelona's game to the Argentinean player. Messi shot 73 goals in the 2011/2012 season, and Guardiola had molded his system around a single player. It troubled him increasingly, and he began to enjoy work less.

In the fall of 2011, after a Champions League match against the Belarusian team FC BATE Borisov, Guardiola mentioned to Barça's president, Sandro Rosell, that he might not renew his contract. The club's management was in turmoil.

In one of his very rare interviews -- for a film about his old club, Brescia Calcio -- he said: "It takes courage to manage such an important institution for four years. The players tire you out, you tire out the players, the press tires you out, and you tire out the press."

On Jan. 13, 2012, there was a party at the Postpalast building in Munich for a belated celebration of Hoeness' 60th birthday. Giovanni Branchini, the Italian agent -- and middleman -- was among the 475 guests. He sat down next to Rummenigge and told him what Guardiola's brother had asked him to say, namely, that what he'd mentioned at the Audi Cup was still true.

After that encounter, Rummenigge began calling Guardiola regularly. Sitting in his office, Rummenigge recalls that the conversations were somewhat odd. "They were really trivial, blah-blah conversations," he says. "You keep beating about the bush but never really get to the point."

A Private Person

Guardiola already had the makings of a coach when he was an 18-year-old player. He was physically inferior to most of his opponents, too slow and much too thin. But there was one thing he could do faster than his opponents: think. His only chance was to read the game better than the others. Johan Cruyff, the coach of his first team, soon made him captain. Guardiola became the head of the legendary "dream team" that won Barcelona's first European Cup. He played with Romária, Michael Laudrup, Ronald Koeman and Zubizarreta. Until Guardiola's debut as coach, the team was considered the best in Barcelona's history. Guardiola was still with Barcelona when Louis van Gaal was hired as coach, but then he moved to AS Roma because he wanted to play under Fabio Capello. At the end of his career, he even moved to a wretchedly bad club in Mexico called Dorados de Sinaloa, because a certain Juanma Lillo worked there. Guardiola thought he was a genius among coaches.

"My brother can be unbelievably stubborn, almost obsessed, and he's always thinking about football, ever since I've known him. It was always clear that he would eventually become a coach. Off the football pitch, he likes his peace and quiet," says Pere Guardiola in his office. He describes Pep as reserved, more of a listener than a talker, and determined to keep his private life private. Once, when he was asked which word he associated with "fame," Pep Guardiola replied: "shit."

He is still together with Cristina Serra, his adolescent sweetheart, who he met at 18. He has three children, wears snugly tailored suits, listens to Coldplay, is considered politically on the left and, like most members of his family, wants independence for Catalonia. He doesn't believe in the existence of God, except in the form of Messi and Maradona, and if he hadn't become a pro footballer, he might have completed his law degree and would be an attorney today.

In late April 2012, Guardiola announced that he was leaving FC Barcelona. He said that he was tired and needed some distance. After that, Pere received daily calls from agents for other top clubs, but the only club Pep wanted to discuss with his brother was Bayern Munich. Pere met Christian Nerlinger, the club's sports director at the time, for a cup of coffee at a Madrid hotel on May 25. The encounter did not make a lasting impression on him.

Pere Guardiola was more interested in the Premier League and tried to convince his brother of the advantages of the "very respectable English." He said that they had small, efficient decision-making bodies and press that, while louder than the German media, was "actually easier to handle." Besides, he said, they had money -- a lot more money.

An offer from Manchester City was especially appealing. Txiki Begiristain, Guardiola's former sports director at Barça, was representing Manchester City. He knew that money wasn't the key to signing Guardiola -- or at least that it wasn't the only factor. They discussed a "project" and the club's plan to invest €150 million, or possibly even more, in new players.

But Pep remained fixated on Munich. With Branchini still acting as go-between, he let Rummenigge know that, after taking a year off in New York, he was eager to work as a coach again -- and that it wouldn't hurt to have a conversation. Rummenigge wanted to know whether it would make sense to meet with Guardiola before his departure to the United States. It would, Branchini said.

Page 2

In July 2012, Rummenigge flew to Barcelona, where Pere Guardiola picked him up from the airport. They drove to a friend's house outside the city, where they spent almost six hours together. Pep Guardiola tried to convey his views about football to Rummenigge, and Rummenigge tried to explain Bayern Munich.

The Bayern president said that FC Bayern held half of its training sessions in public, which is somewhat unusual internationally. It was also something Guardiola would have to accept, he added. In return, Guardiola said that he doesn't give individual interviews, only press conferences, which was how he'd done things in Barcelona. Rummenigge responded that he doesn't force anyone to do one-on-one interviews, and then he asked Guardiola whether he also wanted to bring along an entire staff of his own people, including assistant coaches and specialists, as van Gaal had done. No, said Guardiola, he needed only three of his own people, and the rest didn't matter to him. "If you have good people, I'll work with them," he said.

In early November, Rummenigge received a call from New York. "I want to go to Bayern Munich," Pep Guardiola said at the other end of the line.

Pep immediately hired a German teacher in New York, who had to sign an agreement not to talk to the press. "He did it the way he does everything: obsessively. Four hours a day, like a madman," says Pere. A few months later, Guardiola spent six days in Barcelona around Easter. He hired a teacher who was with him constantly. "It's absurd," says Pere. "You meet your brother for lunch, and the guy doesn't stop speaking German to his teacher." Pere swears that his brother will give his first press conference in German. "He's a stubborn guy. He'll do it."

What was still missing on the Bayern side of things, until the very end, was a fundamental decision in favor of Guardiola. It would have to involve parting ways with successful coach Jupp Heynckes.

Shortly after Guardiola's call, Hoeness, Rummenigge, sports director Matthias Sammer and outgoing financial director Karl Hopfner gathered for a game-changing meeting. There was a long, in-depth discussion, which ended with a unanimous decision in favor of hiring Guardiola. They saw Guardiola as a unique opportunity for the club: the most sought-after coach in the world, and someone who would enable them to complete the pending generational shift. Heynckes was 67 at the time, and Guardiola was 41.

Over the years, Munich has suffered from a certain inferiority complex, at least at the higher European level. Although the Bavarians had been among the top clubs, they had never been quite as dazzling and able to elicit the same admiration as FC Barcelona, Manchester United or Real Madrid. They were upset by the fact that, despite being one of the financially healthiest and best-run club in Europe, they were not the most successful and attractive. It wasn't a club to gush about. Guardiola was supposed to change that.

The only problem was that no one in Bayern's management had actually spoken with the coach serving at that time. Jupp Heynckes knew nothing about all the conversations with Guardiola, and certainly not that an agreement had already been reached with him. Officially, the club had been saying for weeks that it intended to discuss its post-summer plans with Heynckes.

The thinking behind this rigged arrangement was that if Guardiola changed his mind, Heynckes would be damaged as a second choice. Besides, there were important matches scheduled for the end of the year, with Dortmund and Valencia, and the qualification for the round of 16 in the Champions League hadn't been secured yet. The Bayern executives argued that they couldn't know how Heynckes would react to this disappointment. Should we tell the coach now that things won't be continuing, the management team wondered? What do we do if he is angry? They opted for the less risky and less honest choice.

An Emotional Conversation

Hoeness planned to fly to New York in the week before Christmas to meet Guardiola and have him sign the contract. Financial director Hopfner had worked out all the details and given Hoeness the "precise, somehow German" contract, as Guardiola's brother calls it. Hoeness was scheduled to fly to the United States on December 18, a Tuesday. Shortly before his departure, his wife, Susanne, said to him: "Uli, you have to talk to Jupp before you leave. It's your obligation as a friend."

The two men met on the Sunday before Hoeness' departure, in what would be something of a confession for Hoeness. He had to reveal the Guardiola plans, at least in part, to his friend, who had been living in the Hoeness' city apartment for the last year-and-a-half. He would later call it "one of the most difficult conversations of my career."

Then Hoeness and his son Florian, who manages the sausage factory he owns, flew to Chicago for meetings. From there, the Bayern president flew to New York alone.

His meeting with Guardiola was supposed to stay secret. Guardiola had Hoeness picked up in a car with tinted windows from the Four Seasons Hotel in New York. Together with two bodyguards and Guardiola's brother, Hoeness was driven through Manhattan and, finally, into an underground parking garage. Guardiola's apartment, owned by a Deutsche Bank executive, was at 320 Central Park West. It has a private elevator and four bedrooms. The rent was $31,000 a month.

Hoeness spent four hours there. Guardiola's wife, Cristina, cooked dinner, and after the meal the coach presented the president with possible playing systems and lineups for Bayern Munich's next season on his laptop. He told Hoeness that he had watched all of Bayern's matches on TV in New York, as well as Manchester City and FC Chelsea matches. He said that he was convinced that FC Bayern was the team that could come to most closely resemble FC Barcelona. At the time, in December 2012, Hoeness still perceived the remark as a promise.

Guardiola's playing system was thought to be the ultimate, and he was considered invincible. The Barça code would only be cracked in the spring of this year, in the Champions League semi-final, by the man whose end as Bayern's coach Hoeness was just sealing in New York.

On Jan. 16, 2013, with the media already speculating over the upcoming signing of Guardiola, Rummenigge could no longer delay the unpleasant conversation. He had to tell Heynckes that it would be over for him in the summer, even though the irreproachable coach would have liked to stay on for another year.

It was an emotional conversation. Heynckes was upset. Why hadn't Rummenigge and Sammer talked to him about Guardiola before, he asked? Why hadn't they involved him earlier, and why wasn't he given a say in the matter?

In the end, it came down to what the press would be told. Rummenigge offered two options. Either Heynckes would say that he had decided to step down at the end of the season, and that the club had complied with his wishes, or FC Bayern would state that it had hired Guardiola and that Heynckes' contract was not being renewed.

Heynckes chose the first option. After he left, Rummenigge walked over the club president's office, two doors down.

"Karl-Heinz! Are you finished?" Hoeness asked, sitting in an armchair.

"I'm worn out," Rummenigge replied. He had no idea that Heynckes, the man he had just fired, would have the most successful season in FC Bayern's history in the coming weeks.

A Major Challenge

Heynckes' resentment over the way he had been treated became an incentive for him to show everyone what he was made of. He worked even harder and with greater concentration than before, almost to the point of physical exhaustion. He knew that he had only about half a year left, and he took advantage of the time he had left. FC Bayern broke all kinds of records and won the treble by securing the Bundesliga title, the European Cup and the German Cup in the same season. And now Heynckes is leaving on a high note.

"I'm leaving behind a world-class team, perhaps the best team in the world," he said last week at his farewell ceremony. And no one protested. FC Bayern has gained the respect of all of Europe in recent weeks. It's reached the dimension it has always aspired to, the dimension to which Guardiola was in fact supposed to take it to.

Until now, it was thought that Guardiola's successes were a problem for Heynckes, but now the situation seems to have been reversed. How is going to top the treble? Sitting in his office, Pere Guardiola pretends as if he doesn't understand that discussion. "A man who was the coach at Barcelona knows what pressure is," he says, and points out that his brother is simply the kind of person who always has always had to win and that nothing has changed.

The question is not whether the treble makes Guardiola nervous. The question is how someone who has built up one of the best teams of the last few decades handles the expectation of having to repeat the job.

Can Guardiola shape an era once again with FC Bayern, the way he did with Barcelona, or are the skeptics right when they say that with top players like Xavi, Iniesta and Messi in the starting lineup, almost any coach would have won the Champions League?

Frank Rijkaard, Guardiola's predecessor at Barcelona, won the Champions League in 2006 but was subsequently forced to leave the club. He has been wondering aimlessly around the world since then. He was recently fired from his job as head coach of the Saudi Arabian national team after a series of losses. It's the question Guardiola has to answer, and it's the risk he is taking: Can he surpass the maximum?

A person's character reveals itself in defeat. But because Guardiola has never failed, hardly anyone can describe his true character. Guardiola could end up losing in Munich: against himself.

In July 2012, Rummenigge flew to Barcelona, where Pere Guardiola picked him up from the airport. They drove to a friend's house outside the city, where they spent almost six hours together. Pep Guardiola tried to convey his views about football to Rummenigge, and Rummenigge tried to explain Bayern Munich.

The Bayern president said that FC Bayern held half of its training sessions in public, which is somewhat unusual internationally. It was also something Guardiola would have to accept, he added. In return, Guardiola said that he doesn't give individual interviews, only press conferences, which was how he'd done things in Barcelona. Rummenigge responded that he doesn't force anyone to do one-on-one interviews, and then he asked Guardiola whether he also wanted to bring along an entire staff of his own people, including assistant coaches and specialists, as van Gaal had done. No, said Guardiola, he needed only three of his own people, and the rest didn't matter to him. "If you have good people, I'll work with them," he said.

In early November, Rummenigge received a call from New York. "I want to go to Bayern Munich," Pep Guardiola said at the other end of the line.

Pep immediately hired a German teacher in New York, who had to sign an agreement not to talk to the press. "He did it the way he does everything: obsessively. Four hours a day, like a madman," says Pere. A few months later, Guardiola spent six days in Barcelona around Easter. He hired a teacher who was with him constantly. "It's absurd," says Pere. "You meet your brother for lunch, and the guy doesn't stop speaking German to his teacher." Pere swears that his brother will give his first press conference in German. "He's a stubborn guy. He'll do it."

What was still missing on the Bayern side of things, until the very end, was a fundamental decision in favor of Guardiola. It would have to involve parting ways with successful coach Jupp Heynckes.

Shortly after Guardiola's call, Hoeness, Rummenigge, sports director Matthias Sammer and outgoing financial director Karl Hopfner gathered for a game-changing meeting. There was a long, in-depth discussion, which ended with a unanimous decision in favor of hiring Guardiola. They saw Guardiola as a unique opportunity for the club: the most sought-after coach in the world, and someone who would enable them to complete the pending generational shift. Heynckes was 67 at the time, and Guardiola was 41.

Over the years, Munich has suffered from a certain inferiority complex, at least at the higher European level. Although the Bavarians had been among the top clubs, they had never been quite as dazzling and able to elicit the same admiration as FC Barcelona, Manchester United or Real Madrid. They were upset by the fact that, despite being one of the financially healthiest and best-run club in Europe, they were not the most successful and attractive. It wasn't a club to gush about. Guardiola was supposed to change that.

The only problem was that no one in Bayern's management had actually spoken with the coach serving at that time. Jupp Heynckes knew nothing about all the conversations with Guardiola, and certainly not that an agreement had already been reached with him. Officially, the club had been saying for weeks that it intended to discuss its post-summer plans with Heynckes.

The thinking behind this rigged arrangement was that if Guardiola changed his mind, Heynckes would be damaged as a second choice. Besides, there were important matches scheduled for the end of the year, with Dortmund and Valencia, and the qualification for the round of 16 in the Champions League hadn't been secured yet. The Bayern executives argued that they couldn't know how Heynckes would react to this disappointment. Should we tell the coach now that things won't be continuing, the management team wondered? What do we do if he is angry? They opted for the less risky and less honest choice.

An Emotional Conversation

Hoeness planned to fly to New York in the week before Christmas to meet Guardiola and have him sign the contract. Financial director Hopfner had worked out all the details and given Hoeness the "precise, somehow German" contract, as Guardiola's brother calls it. Hoeness was scheduled to fly to the United States on December 18, a Tuesday. Shortly before his departure, his wife, Susanne, said to him: "Uli, you have to talk to Jupp before you leave. It's your obligation as a friend."

The two men met on the Sunday before Hoeness' departure, in what would be something of a confession for Hoeness. He had to reveal the Guardiola plans, at least in part, to his friend, who had been living in the Hoeness' city apartment for the last year-and-a-half. He would later call it "one of the most difficult conversations of my career."

Then Hoeness and his son Florian, who manages the sausage factory he owns, flew to Chicago for meetings. From there, the Bayern president flew to New York alone.

His meeting with Guardiola was supposed to stay secret. Guardiola had Hoeness picked up in a car with tinted windows from the Four Seasons Hotel in New York. Together with two bodyguards and Guardiola's brother, Hoeness was driven through Manhattan and, finally, into an underground parking garage. Guardiola's apartment, owned by a Deutsche Bank executive, was at 320 Central Park West. It has a private elevator and four bedrooms. The rent was $31,000 a month.

Hoeness spent four hours there. Guardiola's wife, Cristina, cooked dinner, and after the meal the coach presented the president with possible playing systems and lineups for Bayern Munich's next season on his laptop. He told Hoeness that he had watched all of Bayern's matches on TV in New York, as well as Manchester City and FC Chelsea matches. He said that he was convinced that FC Bayern was the team that could come to most closely resemble FC Barcelona. At the time, in December 2012, Hoeness still perceived the remark as a promise.

Guardiola's playing system was thought to be the ultimate, and he was considered invincible. The Barça code would only be cracked in the spring of this year, in the Champions League semi-final, by the man whose end as Bayern's coach Hoeness was just sealing in New York.

On Jan. 16, 2013, with the media already speculating over the upcoming signing of Guardiola, Rummenigge could no longer delay the unpleasant conversation. He had to tell Heynckes that it would be over for him in the summer, even though the irreproachable coach would have liked to stay on for another year.

It was an emotional conversation. Heynckes was upset. Why hadn't Rummenigge and Sammer talked to him about Guardiola before, he asked? Why hadn't they involved him earlier, and why wasn't he given a say in the matter?

In the end, it came down to what the press would be told. Rummenigge offered two options. Either Heynckes would say that he had decided to step down at the end of the season, and that the club had complied with his wishes, or FC Bayern would state that it had hired Guardiola and that Heynckes' contract was not being renewed.

Heynckes chose the first option. After he left, Rummenigge walked over the club president's office, two doors down.

"Karl-Heinz! Are you finished?" Hoeness asked, sitting in an armchair.

"I'm worn out," Rummenigge replied. He had no idea that Heynckes, the man he had just fired, would have the most successful season in FC Bayern's history in the coming weeks.

A Major Challenge

Heynckes' resentment over the way he had been treated became an incentive for him to show everyone what he was made of. He worked even harder and with greater concentration than before, almost to the point of physical exhaustion. He knew that he had only about half a year left, and he took advantage of the time he had left. FC Bayern broke all kinds of records and won the treble by securing the Bundesliga title, the European Cup and the German Cup in the same season. And now Heynckes is leaving on a high note.

"I'm leaving behind a world-class team, perhaps the best team in the world," he said last week at his farewell ceremony. And no one protested. FC Bayern has gained the respect of all of Europe in recent weeks. It's reached the dimension it has always aspired to, the dimension to which Guardiola was in fact supposed to take it to.

Until now, it was thought that Guardiola's successes were a problem for Heynckes, but now the situation seems to have been reversed. How is going to top the treble? Sitting in his office, Pere Guardiola pretends as if he doesn't understand that discussion. "A man who was the coach at Barcelona knows what pressure is," he says, and points out that his brother is simply the kind of person who always has always had to win and that nothing has changed.

The question is not whether the treble makes Guardiola nervous. The question is how someone who has built up one of the best teams of the last few decades handles the expectation of having to repeat the job.

Can Guardiola shape an era once again with FC Bayern, the way he did with Barcelona, or are the skeptics right when they say that with top players like Xavi, Iniesta and Messi in the starting lineup, almost any coach would have won the Champions League?

Frank Rijkaard, Guardiola's predecessor at Barcelona, won the Champions League in 2006 but was subsequently forced to leave the club. He has been wondering aimlessly around the world since then. He was recently fired from his job as head coach of the Saudi Arabian national team after a series of losses. It's the question Guardiola has to answer, and it's the risk he is taking: Can he surpass the maximum?

A person's character reveals itself in defeat. But because Guardiola has never failed, hardly anyone can describe his true character. Guardiola could end up losing in Munich: against himself.

Page 2

European football has changed considerably since Guardiola began his coaching career at FC Barcelona in the summer of 2008. He was one of the worst-paid coaches in the Primera División, without professional experience and faced with the legacy of an unruly squad trained by his predecessor, Frank Rijkaard. The change has something to do with Guardiola's record, which reads like a sugarcoated biography. In four years, he won 14 out of 19 possible titles, including two Champions League victories, three national titles and two FIFA Club World Cup trophies.

But the problems began to accumulate in early 2011. Both French defender Éric Abidal and Guardiola's friend and assistant coach Tito Vilanova were diagnosed with cancer. The team lost some of its intensity. Guardiola's talks sometimes lacked persuasiveness, and he started having trouble motivating his players. Guardiola is a strong communicator. He can be witty, glib and sometimes even funny.

In the meantime, rival club Real Madrid had bought itself the world's most expensive team, and its top priority was to defeat Guardiola's Barcelona. A dispute with José Mourinho, Guardiola's adversary at Real, escalated. During one of the matches between the two teams, known in Spain as El Clásico, there were scuffles between players and coaches.

Even golden boy Lionel Messi was causing problems. Guardiola was increasingly tailoring Barcelona's game to the Argentinean player. Messi shot 73 goals in the 2011/2012 season, and Guardiola had molded his system around a single player. It troubled him increasingly, and he began to enjoy work less.

In the fall of 2011, after a Champions League match against the Belarusian team FC BATE Borisov, Guardiola mentioned to Barça's president, Sandro Rosell, that he might not renew his contract. The club's management was in turmoil.

In one of his very rare interviews -- for a film about his old club, Brescia Calcio -- he said: "It takes courage to manage such an important institution for four years. The players tire you out, you tire out the players, the press tires you out, and you tire out the press."

On Jan. 13, 2012, there was a party at the Postpalast building in Munich for a belated celebration of Hoeness' 60th birthday. Giovanni Branchini, the Italian agent -- and middleman -- was among the 475 guests. He sat down next to Rummenigge and told him what Guardiola's brother had asked him to say, namely, that what he'd mentioned at the Audi Cup was still true.

After that encounter, Rummenigge began calling Guardiola regularly. Sitting in his office, Rummenigge recalls that the conversations were somewhat odd. "They were really trivial, blah-blah conversations," he says. "You keep beating about the bush but never really get to the point."

A Private Person

Guardiola already had the makings of a coach when he was an 18-year-old player. He was physically inferior to most of his opponents, too slow and much too thin. But there was one thing he could do faster than his opponents: think. His only chance was to read the game better than the others. Johan Cruyff, the coach of his first team, soon made him captain. Guardiola became the head of the legendary "dream team" that won Barcelona's first European Cup. He played with Romária, Michael Laudrup, Ronald Koeman and Zubizarreta. Until Guardiola's debut as coach, the team was considered the best in Barcelona's history. Guardiola was still with Barcelona when Louis van Gaal was hired as coach, but then he moved to AS Roma because he wanted to play under Fabio Capello. At the end of his career, he even moved to a wretchedly bad club in Mexico called Dorados de Sinaloa, because a certain Juanma Lillo worked there. Guardiola thought he was a genius among coaches.

"My brother can be unbelievably stubborn, almost obsessed, and he's always thinking about football, ever since I've known him. It was always clear that he would eventually become a coach. Off the football pitch, he likes his peace and quiet," says Pere Guardiola in his office. He describes Pep as reserved, more of a listener than a talker, and determined to keep his private life private. Once, when he was asked which word he associated with "fame," Pep Guardiola replied: "shit."

He is still together with Cristina Serra, his adolescent sweetheart, who he met at 18. He has three children, wears snugly tailored suits, listens to Coldplay, is considered politically on the left and, like most members of his family, wants independence for Catalonia. He doesn't believe in the existence of God, except in the form of Messi and Maradona, and if he hadn't become a pro footballer, he might have completed his law degree and would be an attorney today.

In late April 2012, Guardiola announced that he was leaving FC Barcelona. He said that he was tired and needed some distance. After that, Pere received daily calls from agents for other top clubs, but the only club Pep wanted to discuss with his brother was Bayern Munich. Pere met Christian Nerlinger, the club's sports director at the time, for a cup of coffee at a Madrid hotel on May 25. The encounter did not make a lasting impression on him.

Pere Guardiola was more interested in the Premier League and tried to convince his brother of the advantages of the "very respectable English." He said that they had small, efficient decision-making bodies and press that, while louder than the German media, was "actually easier to handle." Besides, he said, they had money -- a lot more money.

An offer from Manchester City was especially appealing. Txiki Begiristain, Guardiola's former sports director at Barça, was representing Manchester City. He knew that money wasn't the key to signing Guardiola -- or at least that it wasn't the only factor. They discussed a "project" and the club's plan to invest €150 million, or possibly even more, in new players.

But Pep remained fixated on Munich. With Branchini still acting as go-between, he let Rummenigge know that, after taking a year off in New York, he was eager to work as a coach again -- and that it wouldn't hurt to have a conversation. Rummenigge wanted to know whether it would make sense to meet with Guardiola before his departure to the United States. It would, Branchini said.

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